# Why probabilistic support is not inductive

@article{Popper1987WhyPS, title={Why probabilistic support is not inductive}, author={Karl Raimund Sir Popper and David W. Miller}, journal={Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series A, Mathematical and Physical Sciences}, year={1987}, volume={321}, pages={569 - 591} }

This paper attempts to provide both an elaboration and a strengthening of the thesis of Popper & Miller (Nature, Lond. 302, 687f. (1983)) that probabilistic support is not inductive support. Although evidence may raise the probability of a hypothesis above the value it achieves on background knowledge alone, every such increase in probability has to be attributed entirely to the deductive connections that exist between the hypothesis and the evidence. We shall also do our best to answer all the… Expand

#### 60 Citations

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Musgrave (1989), on behalf of deductivists everywhere, noting that “it conduces to clarity” to construe inductive inferences as deductive enthymemes, identifies “Any explanation of a (surprising) fact is true” and “The best explanation of any body of facts istrue” as the premises suppressed in the styles of inductive inference and inference to the best explanation. Expand

Deduction, induction and probabilistic support

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It is argued that viewing induction as occurring only in the absence of deductive relations, as Popper-Miller sometimes do, is untenable, and it is shown that Poppers' claim that deductive Relations determine probabilistic support is untrue. Expand

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- The British journal of mathematical and statistical psychology
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It is proposed that statistical tests work in the same way--in that they are based on examples, invoke the analogy of a model and use the size of the effect under test as a sign that the chance hypothesis is unlikely. Expand

When Probabilistic Support Is Inductive

- Mathematics
- Philosophy of Science
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This note makes a contribution to the issue raised in a paper by Popper and Miller (1983) in which it was claimed that probabilistic support is purely deductive. Developing R. C. Jeffrey's remarks, a… Expand

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Abstract In 1983, in an open letter to the journal Nature, Karl Popper and David Miller set forth a particularly strong critical argument which sought to demonstrate the impossibility of inductive… Expand

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Abstract It is generally accepted that Popper‘s degree of corroboration, though “inductivist” in a very general and weak sense, is not inductivist in a strong sense, i.e. when by ‘inductivism’ we… Expand

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It is shown that Carnap’s construction may be cleared from much of this criticism provided some slight alterations are accepted, and that this opinion is not definitely well-founded. Expand

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Coherence is a key concept in many accounts of epistemic justification within ‘traditional’ analytic epistemology. Within formal epistemology, too, there is a substantial body of research on… Expand

Contentious Contents: For Inductive Probability

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According to Popper and Miller [1983 and 1987], the part of a hypothesis that transcends the evidence is probablistically countersupported by the evidence. Therefore, inductive support is not… Expand

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